Thursday 23 May – from 1:15pm to 2:15pm

Incentive-Compatible and Strongly Fair Cake Cutting

(Joint work with Rupert Freeman (UVA Darden))

Jens Witkowski, Assistant Professor of Computer Science and Management, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

Abstract:

The classical cake cutting setting is concerned with dividing a resource, modeled by the [0,1] interval, and allocating subintervals to different agents. Preferences of agents are represented by a function over the [0,1] interval with the agent’s utility corresponding to the area under the curve for those subintervals they get allocated. A recent result shows that there does not exist a deterministic cake cutting mechanism that is both incentive compatible and even only one of envy-free or proportional. In this work, leveraging proper scoring rules, we design a randomized cake cutting mechanism that is ex ante incentive compatible, ex post strongly proportional, and ex post strongly envy-free. This result is tight in the sense that additionally achieving ex post incentive compatibility is impossible as it would violate the aforementioned impossibility result.

Registration, please contact robin@em-lyon.com

Room 272 – Ecully campus